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Introduction 
Basic mathematics, long a genie for engineers, is proving more and 
more an ally of marketers, New applications in practical operating problems 
represent breakthroughs in using mathematics in an entirely new way - as an 
instrument of imagination, reason, and communication - to formulate crucial 
issues for a marketer's review. Such mathematics enhances, rather than r e places, 
marketing experience, resourcefulness, and judgement by its ability to organize 
and relate a wide variety of diverse factors and thereby narrows areas of opinion, 
assumption and guesswork. It is not proposed to explore the technical elements 
of the mathematical processes as such. It is proposed m erely to indicate useful 
functions they might perform in certain practical problems of promotional 
competition. A mathematical appendix follows. 
This study, by and large, takes the mec hanic s of promotion, such as 
advertising, dealer relations, etc., for g r a nted, as a set of skills available to a 
top level management team. It considers the executive problem of choosing the 
level of promotional effort to be expended in behalf of the overall busin e s s. T h u s: 
for example, we shall be inte·rested in questions such a s : 
How should pro:m.otional effort be allocated among 
several products? 
How should promotional effort be varied under 
changing business conditions? 
Roughly, the first question deals with the "product dimension" of the business, the 
second with the dynamic "time dimension, " 
Our first interest in such questions is in simply understanding what they 
ask - - How is "promotion" to be de£ined? - - What kind of competition is as sumed? 
-- What business objectives are to be served? As it happens~ a clear understanding 
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of a question, with its resulting precision in communication and reasoningj is 
often the greater part of a problem. This need to understand such questions finds 
expre s sion in our study technique - - a three -fold proce s s consisting of 
1) identifying and isolating the functional role of promotion 
in busine s s operations - - both its role in securing market 
volume and its role in the profit and loss statement of the 
busines s, 
2) determining mutual and interrelated impacts of the 
promotional activities of all businesses who compete In 
markets of interest - relating the fortune s of each such 
business to the promotional behavior of it and its competitors, and 
3) deducing simultaneous profit maximizing competitive behavior 
- - called competitive equili brium - industry wide patterns of 
behavior such that each business is maximizing its own profits 
against all other competitive actions. 
From this process, employed in various circumstances, we gain precision in 
asking and reasoning about a variety of business questionso 
A Case History 
To illustrate our intentions quickly, we consider a case where two 
competing brands dominate a fixed market and are engaged in promotional 
(non-price) competition in it . For this example, suppose each company is 
equally proficient in the mechanics of promotion, and share the market proportional 
to their outlays in promotion. The two brands - we will call them "Ail and "B" -
are competing at a standoff, when we suppose that one of them - say A -
suddenly achieves a significant cost reduction. Our intere st is in following the 
competition through this changedbusine s s condition , 
Table la shows the brands at competitive equilibrium., at a standoff, 
each brand having manufacturing co st of 50% of sale s volume. 
Table lao 





Brand Volume 1000 1000 
Promotional Outlay 2.50 250 
Manufac turing Costs 500 500 
Brand Profit 250 250 
In fact, note that the second line i n these balance sheets contain the 
strategic variables - the competing brands decide, individually, what level of 
promotion to employ - t he market (of 2000) is split in proportion to the 
promotional outlays - the manufacturing costs are 5 0% of whatever the volumes 
are - and the profit (or loss) is determined t o bal anc e. 
We also paus e , in Table la, to note that A and B are, indeed, at 
competit ive equil ibriu m - if either of t h em alte r t heir promot ional out lay s, 
their profits suff e r . For e x a m ple , s u ppose B were t o reduce its promotional 
outlay to 150 . Then, the n e w s e t o f balance she e t s wo u l d be a s f o llows, and 
B! s profit drops to 225 . 
A B 
Brand V ol u me 1250 7 50 
P r omoti onal Ou t lay 250 150 
Manufa c turing Costs 625 375 
Brand Profi t 37 .5 225 
Similar ly ~ e ithe r brand will lose profit if it increases i t s p r o m. tional out ay 
each is indeed maximizing its profits against the other. This l as t balance sheet, 
incidentally ~ hints at another general feature of this kind of competition -. he 
competit o r 9 s profit is more sensitive (going up or down) to a chan ge in level 
than the company's own profiL We return to this point later -
We suppose now that brand A achieves a cost reduction, s ay of 20%» 
redu cing i t s manufacturing cost to 40% (from 50%) of sales volume . What is 
A t o do? And how is B to counter? One po s sibility is for A to simply 
pock e t the r eduction - B will not be tempted to move its promo tional ou lay 
eithe r way , so by "standing pat," A preserves the s t atus quo i n t h e m arke s as 
shown in Tabl e lb. 
. 
Table lb. 
Brand A Achieves Manufacturing Cost Redu ction 
and Stands Pat in the Market~ Pocketing the R edu c tion 
_ ::;::=-l --------- - -- - - ,...... -
A E ' A R 
Standoff Stand Pat 
A B - -
Brand Volume 1000 1000 
Promotional Outlay 250 250 
Manufacturing Costs 40 0 500 
Brand Profit 350 250 
While B should be most happy with A's "live and let live" generosity, 
A has less reason for smugness. True, A is making a 100 more profit 
than B (by the "sweat of manufacturing's brow"), but a re-evaluation of 
5. 
the total situation shows that competitive equilibrium has shifted considerably -
if A is to re sume competing effectively as pos sible, it will utilize a promotional 
outlay of 298 rather than 250 -- B's best counter to this strategy is to drop 
its promotion slightly to 248, and the situation becomes that of Table Ie. 
Table lc. 
Brand A Reinve sts a Portion of its Cost Reduction 
in Promotion to Achieve a New Competitive Equilibrium 
--~ 
- - - -
---~~ - -- - ~- '--'"t- -
A I B A B 























We summ arize the prof i t picture through this change of busines s condition 
Profits 
Stan doff Stand Pat Competing 
A 25 0 350 357 
B 250 250 207 
Notic e at the n ew competitive equilibrium, that A has used its cost advantage 
more t o B' s d i s comfort than to AI s immediate gain" As noted above, the 
c ompetitor ' s pro fit is mor~ sensitive to a change in promotional level than t h e 
busin e ss own p r of it. It is easy to see why, qualitatively - an increase in promot i onal 
level s et s u p p artially compensating profit forces of increased revenues and inc r ease d 
cos s i n the b usiness, but uncompensated decreased revenues i n the competit o r. 
Study Potentials 
A major busine ss potential of this new k ind of application of basic 
rna hemati c s i s that it provides a f ramework for exe cutive thought, in much the sam 
way physi c s s upplies a f ramework for an engineer to think in. We all know t he 
.a lor 0 a missile has noth ing to do with it s ballistic p r operti e s - f e we r of us know 
th weight of the mis s i le is of n o m ore direct import ance to it s b alli s tic s than its 
lor. Thes and thou sands of o t h e r "back g round f a ct s " a llo w e n g inee rs t o g et at 
h bear t s of their problems in short ord r - t o separate the wheat f r om t he chaff -
to rnak "0 'der of magnitude" calculations - t o tell big p roblems f rom little one s. 
In a simi lar way, a s olid a nd s ou nd f r a me wo r k o f background facts 
in th a natom of p rom o iona l c ompeti tion provides e xecutives with sev eral shortcuts 
o Irlarke t -ng problem s, by m e a n s of 
1) rul e s o f t h u m b , 
2) key r e lations h ips and facts, 
3) gu ides for measurement and contro l . 
Cons i d er 1 in h e case his tory above, the disposition of the addition2.1 
p rofits b tween the s t a nd pat and competing solutions~ A certain amount of 
t he co s a dvant age wa s r e invested for greater strategic leverage, as shown in 
Tabl e 2 . 
Table 2. 
How is a Cost Advantage Followed Up? 





~ I Volume 
52 
Prof it 
In s hor , 5 2 of t he extra 100 i s take n directly as profit and 48 reinvested, sen t 
II u nd the h o r n " t hrou g h promotion and volume t o profit. 
Yet m a j o r que s t· ons r ma.in - whe re did t h e 48 (t o be reinvested) come 
£ om? What facto rs d i ctat e i t s s iz e a n d b y wh at r e lat ions? The diffi c u l t y is 
hat the 48 could b e a 10 of thing s - - i i s a pproxirna t e ly h alf of t he 10 0 , i t is 
2 % incr-ea s e ln p romot i on al level wh i c h m.a y b e r e l a t e d to the 20% de reas e 
in OS~ s y and a lot of other t h i n g s. But the m a t h e matica l analysis behind our 
c ase histo y give s the f o1 0 ing. 
Rule of Thu m b: 
Follow up a cost re ducti on with an increase in 
prom o ti ona l effort p r opor t ional to the incre a se m a d e 
In unit m n ufactur i n g margin., 
Thus, manufacturing margin went from. 50 to . 60 per dollar for A, 
an increase of 20% (and just accidentally a cost decrease of 20% also), and 
20% of the old promotional level of 250 is 50 - this 50 is approximately the 
48 of the new equilibrium (it is a rule of thumb, not an exact law). 
8. 
Notice, in one sentence, we crystallize out not only the important 
aspects surrounding the reinvestment of cost advantage s in promotion, but also, 
by ommission, indicate what is not important, Many "interesting" facts are like 
the weight of the missile in its ballistics - completely irrelevant. Included among 
this array of engaging irrelevancies are such items as unit profits, dollar sale 
volumes, and unit cost savings! 
As another illustration of some of the background facts of executive 
interest, we illustrate a key relationship in the case history. In the mathmatical 
analysis behind this case history we also obtain the following. 
Key Relationship: 
At competitive equilibrium, the profit of a brand 
varies as the cube of the unit manufacturing margin. 
To illustrate this relationship notice . in ·the , second instance of competitive 
equilibrium, the unit manufacturing mar gin ratio (between A and B ) 
is . 60 / . 50 = 1. 20, and the profit ratio is 357/207 = 1. 73. The key relationship 
stated above is 
(.60/150)3 = (1.20)3 = 1.73 = 357/207. 
Notice the relationship gives quantitive basis to the intuitively known phenomena 
that a small edge can be parlayed, through effective strategy, into large advantage . 
B f e xtending the anaJ.. )i ;,,; l and introducing the concept of promotional 
effe-ctiveness ,i the key relation-ship abov.e is ~extended . as below. A -::ompany .will 
be' 'said 'to have 800/0 promotiorfal: eff~ctilVeness of another if a dollar spent in 
promotion just matches . 80 cents spent by the other. 
Extended Key Relationship 
At competitive equilibrium, the profits of a brand 
varies as the square of the, promotional effectiveness 
and the cube of the unit manufacturing margin. 
Remarkably enough, the rule of thumb above, on how cost reductions should 
be reinvested is unchanged even when varying promotional effectiveness is 
introduced. This, of course, is a new and important rule of thumb in itself. 
The se relationships are derived in the ,appendix. 
Study Technique s 
9. 
From the brief description of our study techniques above it is apparent 
that fundamental managerial judgements must enter analyses of promotional 
competition. To begin with, the term "promotion" must he operationally defined; 
such a definition will depend on the particular problem in mind - institutional 
advertising is part of promotion in a five -year problem, and probably not part 
of a two -month problem. 
Conceptually, in order to identify and isolate the functional role of 
promotion in business operations, we need, at least to distinguish between 
Promotional Outlay -- for advertising, creative sale s 
promotion, marketing innovations, etc., which create 
market demand for a brand. 
Logistic Costs - - for manufacturing, distribution, 
warehousing, etc., which react to created market 
demands for a brand. 
Notice that Promotional Outlay has a natural time dimension -advertising per 
year, etc., while Logistic Costs have a natural unit dimension - material per 
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unit. etc. The se two dimensions are reconciled. looking backward 9 in financial 
statements. by means of "unit per year" volume performance lI a dvertising 
per unit." "material cost per year. " etc .• but they must be kept dimensionally 
separate looking forward. 
In order to incorporate promotional effort into the profit and los s 
statement of a brand. we must isolate both its cost and its effect o Whereas we 
can simply keep track of its cost. the effect of promotional outlay on profit is 
indirect, through sales volume, depending on the competitive situation. For 
this reason we symbolize the following sequence of statements: 
"Profit (P) is Sales Volume (S) less Cost (C)",or: 
p=S-C. 
"Profit (P) is Sale s Volume (8) les s Logistic Costs (L) 
less Promotional Outlay . (X)" , or: 
P = 8 - L -X 
"Profit (P) is Unit Logistic Margin (M) times Unit 
Volume (V) less Promotional Outlay (X)", or: 
P = MV - X 
In this final equation X represents the cost and V the effect of the promotional 
outlay. 
Now such an equation will exist for each brand of each business competing 
in an overall industry. On one hand, the profit of a singl e business is the sum of 
its brand's profits (less corporate expenses, etc.), while on the other hand the 
competition within each market will depend on which businesses have brands in 
the market. We can denote competition as illustrated in the following table. 
11. 
Markets 
A B C D E F 
1 * * * * 
2 ~:< ):c Y.e >:c * 
Businesses 3 )!c * 
4 * ):c ~'c 
5 * * ):c >:c ~:c 
For example, business 1 has brands in markets A, C, D, and F; in market 
A, the competitors to A~s brand are those of businesses 2 and 5. In this 
way we describe a situation of competition, market by market, underlying the 
more visible competition between businesses. And for each asterisk in the table 
above, the business in that market has the brand problem: 
In P = MV - X, how big should X be ? 
With the qualitative complications, 
a) The bigger X is, the bigger V will be. 
b) Other businesses have the same problems with their 
competing brands - the bigger their XI s are the smaller 
our ,V will be. 
We obtain a quantitative fix to these complications with the following, 
or similar kinds of, as sumptions : 
1) The competition in each market is promotional -
advertising, distribution promotion, etc., at 
fixed price s. 
2) Each market is fIxed in total volume - additional 
promotion by one brand cuts into other brands rather 
than creating new volume. 
3) Each business is equally proficient in promoting its 
brands -brand shares in each market are proportional 
to the promotional effort allocated to that market. 
12. 
(It goes without saying that such assumptions need ve.rification and possible 
\ , 
modification in any specific business.) For example, if only businesses 1, 
2, 3 were in markets A, B, C, D, and allocated promotional efforts $ in 














































Notice it is not the aggregated promotional outlays 8, 000, 7, 000 and 10 $ 000 
which compete, but the specific outlays 2, 000 versus 3, 000 in market A, 
etc., which produce market splits 4,000 versus 6,000 in market A, etc., 
(in direct proportion as assumed). 
Finally, we deduce simultaneous profit maximizing competitive behavior 
for each busine s s in all markets it compete s in, by technique s of game theory 
(see Appendix for m.athematical details). That is, we find a set of XI s, one 
for each brand in each .market so that the total profit of each business (a sum of 
the P = MV - X for each of its brands) is a maximum against all other XI s 
of competing businesses. This pattern of XI s is called competitive equilibrium. 
The key relationship and rules of thumb described above are rigorous 
consequences of the formulation and determination of competitive equilibria in 
various circumstances in the case history. Thus~ it is possible to discover $ by 
completely theoretical means, patterns of competitive behavior which marketers 
13. 
may use in sizing up complex situations and bringing their experience to bear 
most effectively. 
In illustration of further relationships available, we discover when all 
unit logistic margins within each market are comparable that at competitive 
equilibrium, approximatelYll 
x = VMn 2 
(n + 1) 
where n is the number of other competitors in the market (n = 1 in markets A 
and B, above, n = 2 in C and D), V total (unit) market, and M unit 
logistic mar gino 
As an example of the use of this relationship we consider a different 
situation facing a single business in each of several markets below, and indicate 
an idealized allocation of promotional effort among its products. 
Markets 
A B C D E 
Market 
1,000 2,000 4,000 8,000 3 11 000 in units: 
Logistic 
2.0 4.00 3.00 1. 00 2.00 
margin: 
Number of 
competitors: 4 1 9 19 4 
Allocate 
1(2)( 4) 2(4)(1) 4(3)(9) 8(1)(19) 3(2)(4) 
proportional 
25 4 100 400 25 
to: 
% allocation: 7% 42% 23% 7% 21% 
Working Paper 
A Mathematical Theory of Promotional Competition 
Introduction 
We shall be concerned with a game-theoretic analysis of a set of pay-
off functions, each of which are partially controlled by each of a set of 
variables. We seek to study, thereby, various aspects of promotional 
competition, by interpreting the payoffs and variables as profits and pro-
motional outlays of competing firms. The structure of the relationship 
between variables and payoffs reflects varying points of interest and 
emphasis in the study of the competition. 
In this study we suppose the ccmpetition is purely promotional --
that each firm competes at given prices and with given producing and dis-
tributing policies. In every case, we shall assume a profit on a product 
can be ~itten as 
1<there 
p = pv - cv - x - :f 
P is profit, 
v is unit volume, 
p is unit price, 
c is unit variable producing and distributing cost, 
x is promotional outlay in creative selling, 
f is allocated and/or fixed costs. 
By using the definition m c p - c, called the unit logistic margin, we 
can shorten this profit description to 
P = mv - x - f • 
lole take m and f to be given (as :far as the marketer is concerned), while 
x, and thereby v (in conjunction with competitive conditions) are strate-
gicaJ.ly selected, resulting in profit P, as indicated. 
This bas io profit model. is employed in several variations, by viewing 
the problems of promotion of a Single company broken down into a series of 
subproblems dealing with specific "markets" - a market being taken as a 
segment of competitive activity determined by such criteria as product, 
2· 
geography, class of users, etc. of suitable homogeneity for the study at 
hand. A company meets different co~etitors and different problems in its 
various markets. We shall refer to any given company's product in any 
given market as a 1lbrand. tt A company's performance, then, in volume or 
profit is the sum of its brand performances. 
A General ~bdel of Competition 
Let I be a set of companies 1 J be a set of markets, and K C I X J 
be a set of brands,; k = (i) j) € K means company i € I has a product 
in market j E J. Correspondingly, for each (1, j) € K, we have a profit 
model (we take m
ij 
> 0 throughout) , 
Pij = mijvij - xij - f ij • 
TotaJ. profit Pi 1 for company i is 
P. = ~ Pi"' J 1 = (jJ(i, j) € K} • 1. j€J
i 
J 
The structure of these profit models is ultimately determined by the 
relation between promotional outlays X
ij 
and unit volumes. In its 
simplest form, we shall assume a market, fixed in total unit volume, is 
shared among its brands in proportion to the brand promotional outlays -
i.e., if brand promotionaJ. outlays are ~ I x2 ' ••• , xn ' in a market with 
unit volume Y, then the brands will have unit volumes 
xV 
n 
In general, we shall want to weaken this assumption, and do so in three 
resIJects: 
1. We define coefficients of' relative brand promotion 
effectiveness ~,a2~ ••• , an' to denote the relative effec-
tiveness 01: promotional. outlays, and suppose resulting unit 
volumes, if promotional outlays ~,~, ••• , xn are employed, 
are 
~X1V ~x2V 
~~ + ••• + C¥nxn' c;.~ + ••• + O!nXn' 
... , axv nn 
For convenience 'We scale the 0:1 so max.{Ct1} = 1, and call the 
term <1.t~ the lteffect1ve promotional outlay" of brand k. 
2. We define an exponent of market promotion effectiveness, 
th 
e, and suppose market volume is s~l1t proportional to the e 
power of the effective promotional outlays of the brands, or with 
\Ulit volumes 
• 
When e = 1, the market is simply split proportional to the 
effective promotional outlay, as above; empirical data. suggests 
e is close to 1 in many markets. 
3. We define a market expansion rate f3, and suppose 
total market unit volume is not fixed, but increases with the 
aggregate promotional outlays employed in it, as indicated below 
market volume = V + f3[(al~)e + ••• + (CXnXn)e] • 
We cast these additional parameters in general form, as follows, defining 
I j = {i I ( i, j) € K} (the cOInl>anies competing in market j ) 
e. 
(a.jx .. ) J 
~ ~J 
The equations listed above define company profits as a function of 
promotional outlays to markets, for x
ij 
~ 0 
Pi = Fl (x), x = (xij ), (1, j) E K, 
We use as landmarks competitive equilibrium points 
o property x ~ 0, and for all x ~ 0, 
i e I • 
° x, 'Which have the 
Pi(xo) ~ P1(XO(x
ij
), (1, j) E K, i € I 
Competition Between Two Brands in a Fixed Market 
Cons ider a i'ixed market in 'Y7hich only two brands compete. We can 





Necessary conditions for a competitive equilibrium point (x, 'X) > 0 are 
OP 
- == 0 , 
~x 
which can be rewritten as 
--e Vrr.e(amoc) 
x x 
and has the solution, which can be verified as an equilibr1'lm1 point, 
with the equilibrium payoffs 
o om e Xo -0 an e i.0 
p ::; [(Oln) + 1 - e] e - f, P a [(om) + 1 - e] e - f • 
We notice, remarkably enough, that the ratio xOI XO = ml iii, a relation 
independent of e, tt, and a. In addition, when e = 1, the ratio 
pO + f/ po + f :: clm3/ a2m3 - i.e., gross total margins va:ry as the 
squ~e of the relative brand promotional effectiveness and as the cube of 
the unit logistic margins. 
5· 
Simple Promotional Competition Among n Brands 
Consider, now, a fixed market which is shared in proportion to com-
peting promotional outlays. We simplify our notation to the game defined 
by payoff functions 
(1) i = 1, 2, ••• , n , 
(we take Pi = 0 if ~ Xj = 0). Our main results for this case are: 
j 
1. There exists a unique competitive equilibrium point 
for each game defined by (1). 
2. A finite algorithm exists for determining this pOint. 
The existence and uniqueness of the competitive equilibrium point will be 
established as a by-product of the aigorithm. 
(2) 
For convenience, consider the derivatives 
= 
2Vmi 1: Xj 
j!i 
We note that when x. = 0, (2) reduces to 
~ 
, 
(4) - 1 , 
i = l, 2, ••• , n 
i = 1, 2, ••• , n • 
i = 1, 2, ••• , n • 
The system of equations obtained by setting the expressions of (2) to zero 
(each i) can be solved for ~, x2' ••• , xn and yield the following 
information (divide equation 1 by mi and sum all equations, solve for 
t x
j
, and resubstitute this result into the individual equations) 
J 
6. 
~ . (n - 1)V _ V(!!..:l:)M 
~ x .. = 1 - , 
j aJ E- n n 
j mj 
where Mn is the harmonic mean of ~, m2, ••• I mn , 
(6) 
M 
( n -1) [1 (_n - 1)_n] = V(_n -l)M h XiIl:V--M -n n n m
i 
n n i 
where 
(8) 
If the xi are all positive in this solution, they constitute an equi-
librium point, for (2) gives necessary conditions that each payoff is a 
maximum with all competing strategies fixed, and (3) provides sufficient 
conditions. Of course, the Xi are not necessarily positive (or zero) 
and the solution (6) corresponds to no equilibrium point. However, by 
considering solutions of the type of (6) for successively inclusive sub-
sets of the players, the following algorithm yields an equilibrium point. 
Algorithm 
1. Relabel players, if necessary, so 
m1 >m2 >···>m • - - - n 
2. Set an integer parameter t;: 2 ( twill corres-
pond to the number of players i with Xi > 0 at each stage 
of the algor! tbm) • 
( 
0 0 0) 3 • Find an equilibrium point ~,~, ••• J xt for 
the game containing players 1" 2, ••• J t by using (6). 
4. If t < n, test whether 
( t -1) mt+l > -:r- Mt • 
If yes, go to step 2 and replace t by t + 1. 
( 0 0 0 ) If no, then ~I~' ••• , xt ' 0, ••• , 0 is the unique 
equilibrium point for the game with all players 1, 2, ••• , n. 
Theorem. Given a game defined by (1), there exists a 
unique competitive equilibrium point, and the .Al.gorithm just 
above determines this point in a finite number of steps. 
Prqof. We show the Algor! tbm terminates with a unique competitive 
equilibrium point in a finite number ot steps. It is clear that the 
Algorithm terminates in a finite number of steps. The crucial assertions 
are 
a) The solutions to (6) constitute equilibrium points at each occa-
sion of use in the Algorithm. 
b) A negative answer to the test of step 4 provides a unique equi-
librium pOint for the full game with players 1, 2, ••• , n as indicated. 
We take these assertions up in that order. 
a) At step 3 either i) t = 2, or ii) there was a positive answer 
at step 4 for t - 1. 
and 
and 
Case i). When t = 2, (6) reduces to 
o vmi(~m2) 
Xi = 2 > 0 
(ml + m2 ) 
o 0 
(~, x2 ) constitute an equilibrium point. 
Case i1). We have given that 
t-l 1 
mt I: - > t -2 • j=l mj 
Adding 1 to both sides (mt/mt to the left side), 
t 1 
m I: ->t-l, 
t j=1 mj 
or 
( t -1) = -t- Mt • 




= 1 - (!..:..!) ~ > 0 t t m
t 
o 




= 1 - (t t- l ) ~ > 1 _ (!.;..!) ~ = hO > 0 
m
J 
- "Ii mt t 
8. 
and, therefore, xj > 0, J ~ t in (6). Therefore (xi,~, •.. , x~) is 
an equilibrium point on each occasion of use of (6) in the Algorithm. 
b) With a negative answer to the test of step 4, we have 
( t -1) ms 5 -t- Mt' s > t + 1 • 
At the point (xi,~, •.. , x~, 0, ••• , 0), by (4) and (5) 
~p tm 
s s 
~x = (t - 1 )M - 1 ~ 0 
s t 
and the second derivative is negative by (3). Hence Ps assumes its 
( 
0 0 0 ) maximum at Xs = 0, s ~ t + 1, and ~, x2 ' ••• , xt ' 0, ••• , 0 is an 
equilibrium point. To establish ihe uniqueness of this equilibrium point 
o we note, first, that this is the unique equilibrium point x for which 
o 0 
Xj = ° and ~ > 0, imply mj <~. We further assert that for no equi-
000 
librium point x can Xj = 0, ~ > 0 and mj ~ ~. Otherwise suppose 
o 0 
Xj > 0, j ~ t, ~ = 0, k > t and for same .1, k, mj > ~, j ~ t < k. 
Then (x~, ••• , x~) satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions of 
(2) and (3) for the game with players 1, ••• , t. In particular, 
M 
x~ = V(t~ 1) Mt [l _ (t; 1) ~] > 0 
or 
• 
Alternatively, consider the derivative of Pk at X
O (where ~ = 0), 
using (4) and (5), which is 
~Pk = V~ _ 1 > vmj 
~ (t - 1 )M (t - l)M 
t t t t 
- 1> 0 
o 0 Thus, Pk is not maximized at ~ = 0, and x is not an equilibrium 
point. This establishes the uniqueness of the equilibrium point whose 
existence was established above, and completes the proof of the Theorem. 
General Promotional Competition Among n Brands 
The results for Simple Promotional Competition of the previous section 
can be extended to include varying degrees of promotional effectiveness and 




When the expressions of (10) are equated to zero, the system of equations 
can be solved to yield the following information ( divide equation i by 







If, in these solutions hi > 0, all i, then (~, x2' ••• , xn) consti-
tutes an equilibrium point. Otherwise, with one additional restriction, 
given below, the Algorithm of the preceding section may be extended to this 
case as follows. 
Algori thm (Extension) 
1. Relabel players, if necessary, so 
ex.. ml > a...JlL... > ••• > am. -.L - ~ ~ - - n n 
2. Set an integer parameter t = 2. 
3. Find an equilibrium point (x~> x~, .... , x~) for 
the game containing players 1, 2, ••• , t by using (13). 
4. If t < n, test whether 
• 
If yes, go to step 2 and replace t by t + 1. 
( 000) If no, then Xi'~' ••• , xn' 0, ••• , 0 is the unique 
equilibrium point for the game with all players 1, 2, ••• , n. 
Theorem. Given a game defined by (9) for which 
i = 1, 2, ••• , n 
there exists a unique competitive equilibrium paint, and the 
Algori tbm just above determine-s this point in a finite number 
of steps. 
11. 
Proof. We leave the proof to the reader, since it follows the proof 
of the previous Theorem very closely. The restriction on ~, above, 
guarantees an equilibrium pOint at step 3 when t = 2; otherwise the 
arguments are identical. 
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